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In the first decade after the opening of the Soviet archives, scholars’ focus—
both east and west of where the “iron curtain” once hung—largely centered on 
the most dramatic and violent period of Soviet history: the 1930s. Ground-
breaking studies of the purges, collectivization, and daily life in both the new 
industrial cities and the socialized countryside all transformed the way Soviet 
history was conceived and taught in universities across the world. In contrast, 
the postwar, and post-Stalin, years seemed relatively virgin territory, at least in 
terms of archive-based research; and in the late 1990s, historians, particularly 
graduate students, turned their focus to these later periods. Perhaps in part this 
younger generation wanted to carve out its own territory, but there was more 
to the new trend than simple careerism: new interpretations of the 1930s had 
raised fascinating questions for the decades after 1953. What impact did the 
leader’s death and his subsequent discrediting have on the life stories of those 
who had seen their lives transformed in the 1930s (through migration to the 
city, acquisition of literacy, engagement in mass politics)? How did citizens 
who had, in Stephen Kotkin’s terms, started to “speak Bolshevik” negotiate 
the sudden shifts in rhetoric introduced when Khrushchev attacked the “cult 
of personality”? What impact did the renunciation of terror have on relations 
between government and society, and how were the legacies of Stalinist 
violence to be handled? Growing scholarly interest in World War II and its 
aftermath began to pose additional, and important, questions for the post-
1953 period, particularly with regard to veterans’ expectations for a better 
life, the demographic shortfall and gender imbalance, and the conflicting 
emotions of pride and grief generated by the victories and losses of 1941–45. 
Broader developments within academia also played their part—in particular 
the “cultural turn,” which dramatically expanded the issues, methodologies, 
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and sources with which historians engaged. The poetry, paintings, and films 
of the “thaw” period had long aroused interest abroad (particularly works 
deemed transgressive or subversive), but now scholars began to explore not 
only the politics of production and dissemination but also the wider reception 
of these works. Researchers also turned their attention to the domestic sphere, 
which under Khrushchev became the focus of architects, designers, and party 
officials who ushered in what Susan Reid and David Crowley have called a 
“self-conscious rejuvenation of the material world.”1 The period—once largely 
the domain of political scientists and literary scholars—became ever more 
interdisciplinary, with fruitful cross-fertilization among history, art history, 
film studies, literary criticism, anthropology, and historical sociology.
In this essay I identify three key topics that are emerging as focal points of 
scholarly interest: popular reactions to various reforms often grouped under the 
label “de-Stalinization”; the particular significance of byt under Khrushchev; 
and the nature and scale of dissent in the post-Stalin era. In concentrating on 
these three themes, this essay is, perhaps inevitably, partial and selective, and 
a few qualifications are necessary. First, the focus is Russia and the European 
areas of the Soviet Union, in part because the non-European republics are 
as yet understudied for the post-Stalin era, particularly in comparison with 
the recent work on the early decades of Soviet power in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus.2 Second, my attention centers on social and cultural history 
rather than high politics. Again this largely reflects the state of the field—and 
the difficulties of archive access to Presidium/Politburo materials—though it 
is worth noting William Taubman’s political biography of Khrushchev and 
Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk’s project on regional politics, as well as 
several studies on the foreign policy of this period.3
 1 David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, “Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture 
in Post-War Eastern Europe,” in Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-
War Eastern Europe, ed. Crowley and Reid (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 1–24, here 3.
 2 Exceptions include D. Gasanly, Khrushchevskaia “ottepel´” i natsional´nyi vopros v 
Azerbaidzhane (1954–1959) (Moscow: Flinta, 2009); El´dar Ismailov, Azerbaidzhan: 
1953–1956 gg. Pervye gody “ottepeli” (Baku: Adil’ogly, 2006); Maike Lehmann, “Bargaining 
Armenian-ness: National Politics of Identity in the Soviet Union after 1945,” in Representations 
on the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identity in the Baltic and South Caucasian States, ed. 
Tsypylma Darieva and Wolfgang Kaschuba (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007), 166–89.
 3 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (London: Free Press, 2003); Mark 
Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and 
New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, 2 (1998): 163–214; Vladislav Zubok and 
Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s 
Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). For 
more information about Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s project “Networks and Hierarchies in the 
Soviet Provinces, 1945–1970” (see www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/
research/SovietProvinces, accessed 5 January 2011); and O. V. Khlevniuk, “Regional´naia 
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De-Stalinization: Popular Reactions
During the Cold War, many Western commentators focused on the Kremlin 
power struggles or on the world of high culture, especially the contests among 
writers, artists, and party leaders over the course of cultural policy. Such works 
tended to posit the existence of discrete factions: liberals or reformers battled 
against conservatives, “friends” of change were pitted against its “foes.”4 In 
keeping with the shift toward cultural history, and capitalizing on the new 
materials available to them since 1991, researchers are now increasingly 
interested in charting broader societal responses to the changes occurring. In 
1993, Elena Zubkova’s pioneering Obshchestvo i reformy, 1945–-1964 (Society 
and Reforms, 1945–64) drew scholars’ attention to the existence of a range 
of archival sources that would allow them to explore popular opinion; and 
others have since taken her lead, tackling in more depth some of the issues her 
wide-ranging book raised.5 This new body of work posits the complex nature 
of popular reactions to de-Stalinization, which did not always fit neatly into 
the binary categories that once prevailed.
The most famous event of the period is without doubt Khrushchev’s final 
address at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. The first secretary enumerated 
several major character flaws and failings in the deceased dictator, attacking 
his revolutionary reputation and wartime record, as well as indicating his 
culpability in the purges. Although dubbed the “Secret Speech” and excised 
from the published records of the congress, it was a badly kept secret: the main 
content of the address was relayed to party and Komsomol members and soon 
leaked out to the wider public. Using transcripts of these meetings, reports 
on the popular mood, and letters addressed to party leaders and newspaper 
editors, several historians have tried to map out the diverse ways in which the 
public responded.6 Some people were passionately opposed to the toppling 
vlast´ v SSSR v 1953–kontse 1950-kh gg.: Ustoichivost´ i konflikty,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, 
no. 3 (2007): 31–49. 
 4 Priscilla Johnson, for example, describes the conflicts between “liberals” and “conservatives” 
in the cultural field. In a seminal 1979 article, Stephen Cohen warned against oversimplifying 
the reformist position by painting those in favor of change as being supporters of “liberalization” 
or “democratization” in “our sense of these words”; instead he preferred to speak of “reformers” 
and “conservatives.” See Priscilla Johnson, Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 
1962–64 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); and Stephen F. Cohen, “The Friends and Foes 
of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 38, 2 (1979): 
187–202, here 189. 
 5 E. Iu. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy, 1945–1964 (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia, 1993).
 6 Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to 
De-Stalinization,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change 
in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Jones (London: Routledge, 2006), 41–63; Cynthia Hooper, “What 
Can and Cannot Be Said: Between the Stalinist Past and New Soviet Future,” Slavonic and 
East European Review 86, 2 (2008): 306–27; Karl E. Loewenstein, “Re-Emergence of Public 
Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech,” Europe–Asia 
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of a cherished idol; others rushed to condemn the tyrant, even calling for 
more far-reaching changes. For many, however, the issue was not so clear-cut. 
Repeated calls for further information and clarification were perhaps the most 
common response, and a sense of confusion prevailed. Khrushchev’s criticism 
of the errors of the past also spilled out into the present: many ordinary 
Communists began to attack the corruption of local elites and to question 
the behavior of party leaders in Moscow. Faced with a barrage of conflicting 
responses in 1956, the party leadership seemed to retreat from “radicalism” 
and, even as it made what seemed like a more public and complete attempt 
at de-Stalinization at the 22nd Party Congress, imposed firmer restrictions 
on public discussion and stifled popular iconoclasm.7 Condemning Stalin 
and the purges he had overseen was, perhaps inevitably, problematic: first, 
because repudiating terror raised the practical question of how to treat those 
who had been its victims; second, because condemning Stalin and the terror 
compelled society to rethink the way it understood its own recent, and very 
bloody, past—and by extension how people were now to relate to their own 
life stories.
The release of prisoners began just a few weeks after Stalin’s death, 
with the amnesty decree of March 1953, and over the next five years four 
million prisoners exited the camps and colonies as a result of various decrees 
and commissions.8 The great, and diverse, camp exodus caused a range of 
different problems. Nanci Adler’s monograph shows how former political 
prisoners often faced ingrained hostility upon their return, which made it 
difficult to reintegrate into normal life.9 My own study of the camp exodus, 
which incorporates nonpoliticals, also suggests that many ex-zeks were 
marginalized and that fears regarding rising crime, for which they were often 
Studies 58, 8 (2006): 1329–45; Iu. V. Aksiutin, Khrushchevskaia “Ottepel´” i obshchestvennye 
nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953–1964 gg. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 154–98; Miriam Dobson, 
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 79–105; Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-Imagining the 
Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948–1964” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard 
University, 2007), 206–58.
 7 Jones, “From the Secret Speech.”
 8 A statistical report sent from the MVD to the Central Committee in December 1958 
suggested that between the beginning of 1953 and September 1958, 4,118,414 prisoners 
were released from the corrective-labor camps and colonies. These releases were the result of 
Supreme Soviet decrees and the work of the commissions described earlier, as well as prisoners 
simply finishing their sentences (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii f. 9401, op. 2, 
d. 500, ll. 316–20). It is worth noting that this figure also includes a significant number of 
prisoners sentenced after 1953, not just Stalin-era inmates.
 9 Nanci Adler, The Gulag Survivor: Beyond the Soviet System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002).
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blamed, generated rumor and anxiety.10 In a chapter of his Homosexual Desire, 
Dan Healey explores how visions of the Gulag as a site “for mutual sexual 
cruelty” led some people to fear returnees were bringing “perversions” back 
into mainstream society.11 A slightly different perspective is provided by Alan 
Barenberg’s study of Vorkuta, a city deep within the Gulag empire: here, 
where the boundaries between civilian and camp life had long been porous, 
and where manpower was in short supply, former prisoners were in a far 
stronger position, though they did still have to weather periodic attempts by 
the local authorities to demote them from more influential posts.12 
The difficulties generated by the camp exodus—even if they varied from 
region to region—seem to have played into a more general crisis about how to 
speak about the violence and suffering inflicted under Stalin. Although many 
societies have struggled to come to terms with a violent, traumatic past, these 
difficulties were amplified in the Soviet Union, where the same party-state 
which had overseen terror now sought to distance itself from its earlier crimes. 
Moreover, the metanarrative of progress which underlay Soviet culture made 
it difficult to find an appropriate model to explain the less than uplifting 
nature of recent history. By the early 1960s, writers were trying to make sense 
of the country’s troubled past without crossing inadvertently into the realm 
of “what could not be said.” According to Polly Jones, they had some scope to 
explore the mental trauma and emotional suffering generated by terror, but 
the pain always had to be overcome and vanquished by the end of the work.13 
This did not necessarily satisfy all readers. Denis Kozlov’s detailed study of 
letters sent to the editors of literary journals, particularly Novyi mir, suggests 
that although in the 1950s many subscribers continued to express themselves 
using Stalinist concepts and practices, particularly scapegoating, by the early 
1960s the mood was rather different: following the publication of works by 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Il´ia Erenburg, Kozlov contends, readers were 
desperate for the chance to reflect critically on the terror.14
10 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 21–49, 109–32. See also Marc Elie, “Les politiques à 
l’égard des libérés du Goulag: Amnistiés et réhabilités dans la région de Novosibirsk, 1953–
1960,” Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 327–48; and Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay 
a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” Journal of 
Modern History 78, 2 (2006): 333–76.
11 Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender 
Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 229–44.
12 Alan Barenberg, “From Prison Camp to Mining Town: The Gulag and Its Legacy in 
Vorkuta, 1938–1965” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2007), 350–402.
13 Polly Jones, “Memories of Terror or Terrorizing Memories? Terror, Trauma, and Survival in 
Soviet Culture of the Thaw,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, 2 (2008): 346–71. 
14 Denis Kozlov, “ ‘I Have Not Read, but I Will Say’: Soviet Literary Audiences and Changing 
Ideas of Social Membership, 1958–1966,” Kritika 7, 3 (2006): 557–97; Kozlov, “Naming the 
Social Evil: The Readers of Novyi mir and Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone, 1956–
1959 and Beyond,” in Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, 80–98; Kozlov, “The Readers of Novyi 
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If the opening up of the symbolic border to the East (the frontier between 
the “big zone” of Soviet society and the “little zone” of the Gulag) played a 
role in shaping discussion of the Soviet past and present, so too did increasing 
exposure to the West.15 Greater numbers of people came into contact with 
non-Soviet people, foreign works of art and literature, and exotic consumer 
goods (including Pepsi); some even traveled abroad.16 Describing the 
“cultural” nature of Western attempts to win the Cold War, Walter Hixson 
and Yale Richmond suggest that luring Soviet citizens with consumerist 
delights and “Western values” ultimately proved successful.17 Others, 
however, maintain that Soviet interactions with the “West”—and indeed with 
other parts of the globe—were rather less straightforward, at least in the 1950s 
and 1960s.18 Perhaps the most celebrated, and truly international, event of 
the period was the 1957 Youth Festival held in Moscow, which saw more than 
30,000 foreigners from across the world take to the capital’s streets for a two-
week-long carnival. According to Kristin Roth-Ey, it generated ambivalent 
feelings, and alongside the excitement about illicit contact with “capitalist 
lips” there were concerns about young women behaving “dishonourably.”19 
The “presence of foreigners in Soviet space,” she writes, “upset the balance of 
social and moral order,” exhilarating some, but worrying others.20 In a recent 
Mir, 1945–1970: Twentieth-Century Experience and Soviet Historical Consciousness” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Toronto, 2005), 218–361.
15 On the zones, see Nanci Adler, “Life in the ‘Big Zone’: The Fate of Returnees in the 
Aftermath of Stalinist Repression,” Europe–Asia Studies 51, 1 (1999): 5–19. 
16 On tourism, see Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, eds., Turizm: The Russian and 
East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2006); on visitor responses to foreign art exhibitions, see Eleonory Gilburd, “Picasso in 
Thaw Culture,” Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 65–108; on student reactions to the 
avant-garde music of Western composers, see Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, if Only Musical: 
Unofficial Soviet Music during the Thaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27–66.
17 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961 
(Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997), 230–31; Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the 
Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), xiii–xiv.
18 On the Soviet–African encounter, see Constantin Katsakioris, “L’Union soviétique et les 
intellectuels africains: Internationalisme, panafricanisme et négritude pendant les années de la 
decolonisation, 1955–1964,” Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 15–32; and Julie Hessler, 
“Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War,” Cahiers du monde 
russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 33–64. On contacts with the “socialist countries” of Eastern Europe, see 
Anne Gorsuch, “Time Travelers: Soviet Tourists to Eastern Europe,” in Turizm, 205–26.
19 Evgenii Evtushenko reminisced in an interview: “[At] the [1957] Moscow Youth Festival, 
for the first time in my life, my socialist lips touched so-called ‘capitalist lips,’ because I 
kissed one American girl, breaking any Cold War rules.” See The National Security Archive, 
interview with Evgenii Evtushenko (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-14/
yevtushenko1.html, accessed 2 September 2010).
20 Kristin Roth-Ey, “ ‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose: Sex, Propaganda, and the 1957 Youth 
Festival,” in Women in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Susan E. Reid, Melanie Ilič, and Lynne 
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article on the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow, Susan Reid 
also posits ambivalence toward the West. While visitors were often, though 
not universally, impressed by the consumer comforts of the American home 
on display, they did not necessarily conclude that the capitalist system was 
best, or that the Soviet economy could not—given time to recover from the 
devastation of the war—also provide similar or better living conditions for its 
citizens.21 Stephen Bittner’s exploration of de-Stalinization in a central district 
of Moscow, long the hub of artistic and cultural life, also suggests that the 
process of reform in the 1950s and 1960s generated varied responses both to 
Western culture, and indeed to the revival of pre-Stalinist traditions.22 
The Khrushchev era is increasingly seen as one of flux: people did not 
have to approve all that was new, or denigrate everything from the past; and 
they might use the opportunity created by one feature of de-Stalinization 
to discuss another that was to them more pressing. Debate could thus be 
unpredictable and heated but was quickly checked when anxious leaders 
and officials—whose own positions were often uncertain or inconsistent—
sensed it might undermine fundamental aspects of the communist project. 
The period remains, in the words of Roth-Ey, a time of “contestation and 
change, but not in the familiar liberal–conservative mold.”23 With time, 
differences in interpretation will no doubt emerge more clearly. Zubkova’s 
monograph suggests that when Stalin died, many hoped for and even expected 
substantial change, even if some felt trepidation at the prospect. In the wake 
of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, she argued, widespread optimism and hope 
prevailed, only to be dashed by the government’s refusal to introduce more 
radical change, leading to a real breach by the 1960s between the leaders’ 
limited ideas of reform and the aspirations of the educated public.24 In the 
body of recent scholarship, however, some see the uncertainties and anxieties 
generated by changes of the 1950s as more substantial than Zubkova 
Attwood (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75–93. See also Pia Koivunen, “The 
1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union,” in 
Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilič and Jeremy Smith (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 46–65; and Richmond, Cultural Exchange, 11–13.
21 Susan E. Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika 9, 4 (2008): 855–904. On more general attitudes toward 
the United States, see Rósa Magnúsdóttir, “ ‘Be Careful in America, Premier Khrushchev!’: 
Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Coexistence with the United States in 1959,” Cahiers du monde 
russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 109–30. 
22 Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s 
Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
23 Kristin Roth-Ey, review of Bittner’s Many Lives, in Journal of Modern History 82, 1 (2010): 
251–53.
24 Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy. A. V. Pyzhikov also posits a shift from optimism in the 
1950s to a more pessimistic mindset in the early 1960s, which he relates to rising food prices 
(Khrushchevskaia “ottepel´ ” [Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002], 261–74). 
912 MIRIAM DOBSON
suggests, particularly outside intelligentsia circles.25 Others maintain that 
while attitudes and beliefs nurtured under Stalin may have initially been hard 
to shed, a real shift in thinking was possible by the mid-1960s and that, while 
wrestling with the meaning and legacies of the terror, people were beginning 
to set themselves free from its hold.26 The extent to which individuals felt 
comfortable reading, digesting, and critiquing literary and journalistic texts 
may have played a part in shaping their experience of de-Stalinization and, 
difficult though the existing records make such a task, one of the challenges 
ahead may be for us to begin delineating more precisely the ways in which 
educational and social background—we might call it class—shaped responses 
to the political and discursive shifts occurring in these years. 
Daily Life: Intervention, Control, and Contestation
Landmark political events such as the Secret Speech or the 22nd Party 
Congress produced moments of heightened political engagement, at least for 
those who attended party or Komsomol meetings and probably for those who 
heard, and spread, rumors. But how did Stalin’s death affect citizens in terms 
of the more routine business of daily life? 
In the 1980s, the émigré sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh argued that 
since the late 1950s the Soviet people had “diverted their interests from the 
state to their primary groups (family, friends, and lovers).” The pursuit of 
personal satisfaction, he argued, even hedonism, had become widespread.27 In 
a more recent work, Greg Castillo states that “rather than producing citizens 
committed to living out that role in the public realm,” separate apartments 
became insular outposts of a “niche society.”28 Both works suggest that the 
end of terror enabled people to withdraw into a discrete and protected private 
sphere. 
Yet de-Stalinization was not meant as a retreat—in fact, quite the opposite. 
In reviving Lenin and promising the imminence of communism, Khrushchev 
hoped to reengage the Soviet public in the party’s mission to create a better 
world. In the 1950s, various policies (the onslaught against religion, reform 
in education, and the campaign to cultivate the “virgin lands” of the steppe) 
were all conceived as means of revitalizing the revolutionary cause.29 So 
25 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer.
26 See, for example, the changes described in the work of Denis Kozlov.
27 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-
Stalin Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 13; Shlapentokh, Love, Marriage, and 
Friendship in the Soviet Union: Ideals and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1984).
28 Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 206. 
29 For recent work on the atheist campaigns, see Irina Paert, “Demystifying the Heavens: 
Women’s Religion and Khrushchev’s Anti-Religious Campaign, 1954–1964,” in Women in 
the Khrushchev Era, 203–21; Andrew B. Stone, “‘Overcoming Peasant Backwardness: The 
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too was the party’s crusade to instill Soviet morality into its citizens: if 
communism was to be built, and the use of repressive measures reduced, 
new tactics for shaping the “new Soviet person” were needed. As a result, 
scholars identify the byt campaigns as a central element of the first post-
Stalin decade. In 1999, Oleg Kharkhordin’s The Collective and the Individual 
offered a provocative interpretation of such trends. “Stalin’s successors,” he 
argued, “sought to create a system which was more meticulous and thorough 
in its attention to each individual than the more openly repressive Stalinist 
Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union,” Russian Review 67, 2 
(2008): 296–320; and Tatiana A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 1941–
1961: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years, trans. Edward E. Roslof 
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). On education, see Laurent Coumel, “The Scientist, the 
Pedagogue, and the Party Official: Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and Decision-Making 
in the 1958 Education Reform,” in Soviet State and Society, 66–85; and Michael Froggatt, 
“Renouncing Dogma, Teaching Utopia: Science in Schools under Khrushchev,” in Dilemmas 
of De-Stalinization, 250–66. On the virgin lands, see Michaela Pohl, “Women and Girls in the 
Virgin Lands,” in Women in the Khrushchev Era, 52–74.
Iu. Fedorov, “Festival Crocodile,” magazine graphic 
Krokodil, no. 21 30 July 1957 cover 
Ne boltai! Collection, Prague
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one it replaced.”30 Such a radical reinterpretation of the “thaw”—as a time 
of growing control and intervention rather than relaxation and retreat into 
the private—has proven highly stimulating. Big questions remain, however: 
Was the goal of “mutual surveillance” of which Kharkhordin spoke actually 
achieved? Did the “disciplinary grid” become “faultless and ubiquitous” as he 
contended? Recent research on various issues (crime and punishment, family 
and gender roles, housing and domestic design) engages with Kharkhordin’s 
ideas but often highlights the inconsistent or unanticipated ways the new 
crusade worked out in practice. 
Let us first turn to crime and punishment. As the government tried to 
reduce its reliance on the prison-camp model, it experimented with other 
techniques that were meant to improve law and order in all realms of life. 
One of these initiatives was the campaign against “hooliganism,” an offense 
which was now reconstituted—not without controversy—to include domestic 
violence.31 Another was the creation of Komsomol brigades which patrolled 
the city streets. As Juliane Fürst shows, however, the results were not always 
the heightened social control desired: for example, raiding crime hotspots 
might be popular among Komsomol activists but often resulted in fights and 
brawls erupting between those policing and those being policed.32 The fears 
about crime described above in relation to the Gulag releases suggest that 
some citizens at least were skeptical that the perfect “disciplinary grid” had 
been created.33
Second, let us consider family and gender roles. The government may 
have decriminalized abortion in 1954 but, as under Stalin, it promoted 
family unity, now with even greater tenacity, assiduously dispensing advice 
on good parenting practices.34 Aims and results could diverge, however. 
Although the government wanted the nuclear family to remain intact and 
opposed divorce on principle, Deborah Field argues, courts actually proved 
relatively lenient toward estranged couples, even before the law was revised in 
1965. Judges seem to have accepted that relations between men and women 
were complicated and “their feelings for one another mutable.”35 Although 
30 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), 287.
31 Brian LaPierre, “Private Matters or Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism 
in the Soviet Union, 1939–1966,” in Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia, ed. 
Lewis H. Siegelbaum (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 191–207.
32 Juliane Fürst, “The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities in Soviet Youth Culture and 
Policy between Stalin and Khrushchev,” in Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, 135–53, here 136.
33 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 133–85.
34 Melanie Ilič, “What Did Women Want? Khrushchev and the Revival of the Zhensovety,” in 
Soviet State and Society, 104–21, here 116.
35 Deborah Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2007), 71. 
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the press was full of advice about family relationships, the image of the 
ideal woman was highly contradictory: byt remained a female domain, but 
a woman who devoted herself entirely to the domestic sphere and fussed 
over her children was the object of scorn.36 In practice, sexual and marital 
patterns started to change rapidly in this period, despite all the government’s 
propagandizing of stable family life: more men remained single; the abortion 
rate skyrocketed; premarital sexuality became more socially acceptable; and 
divorce rates rose rapidly.37
Third is housing and domestic design. Kharkhordin’s work has been 
particularly stimulating with regard to one of the most important Khrushchev-
era developments: the 1957 promise to end the housing shortage within ten 
years. Given the extent of the problem in the postwar years, such a goal was 
not achievable, but it nonetheless led to a massive construction project that 
provided separate apartments for millions of families. The project was typical 
of the era: it was about exploiting new technological capacities; providing 
better welfare for citizens; and building the communist future.38 It was also 
a perplexing development. As Steven Harris has argued, the commitment 
to the single-occupancy abode reversed a long-standing, if inconsistent, 
championing of the communal apartment.39 Yet the party-state did not 
necessarily conceive of the separate apartment as private space; and in line 
with Kharkhordin’s arguments, scholars are exploring the myriad ways that 
outside agencies tried to direct and shape behaviors within the domestic 
sphere, including advice literature, housekeeping lessons, and competitions 
for the best-maintained apartments.40 But they also examine how, in practice, 
these attempts to shape citizens’ behavior proved rather more complicated. 
Families, once installed in their new homes, reacted selectively to the advice 
36 Mariia Antonova, “Satira kak instrument distsipliny tela v epokhu khrushchevskikh 
reform: Formirovanie identichnosti sovetskoi zhenshchiny v 1950–1960-e gody,” in Sovetskaia 
sotsial´naia politika: Stseny i deistvuiushchie litsa, 1940–1985, ed. Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova and 
Pavel Romanov (Moscow: Variant, 2008), 290–312. 
37 Field, Private Life, 63–68. See also Igor S. Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia from the Age 
of Czars to Today, trans. James Riordan (New York: Free Press, 1995), 68–70. 
38 Susan E. Reid, “The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific–Technological 
Revolution,” Journal of Contemporary History 40, 2 (2005): 289–316; Christine Varga-Harris, 
“Home-Making and the Aesthetic and Moral Perimeters of the Soviet Home during the 
Khrushchev Era,” Journal of Social History 31, 1 (2008): 561–89; Lynne Attwood, “Housing 
in the Khrushchev Era,” in Women under Khrushchev, 177–202; Mark B. Smith, Property of 
Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2010).
39 Steven E. Harris, “In Search of ‘Ordinary’ Russia: Everyday Life in the NEP, the Thaw, and 
the Communal Apartment,” Kritika 6, 3 (2005), 583–614, here 612. 
40 Catriona Kelly, Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine 
to Yeltsin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 321–67; Victor Buchli, An Archaeology of 
Socialism (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 165–71.
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showered on them. Although the experts preached aesthetic “unity,” for 
example, in reality people might mix new, contemporary furniture with older 
items, either because of shortages or simply because they cherished possessions 
which held important emotional associations and memories.41 People often 
had clear expectations regarding their new life. At meetings organized at a 
local level for residents to voice complaints, and in the many letters citizens 
wrote on the subject of housing, people were willing to criticize architects 
and officials alike.42 Yet they were also ready to invoke state agencies as allies 
in their quest to achieve their own goals: for example, an official “war against 
noise” was launched, Harris suggests, in response to requests for the state to 
help silence raucous neighbors.43
Later the butt of jokes, the khrushcheby in fact represented important 
aspects of the first post-Stalin decade: the attempt to meet citizens’ long-
cherished hopes of a better life converged with the desires of architects and 
designers, influenced by modernism, to create an aesthetically pleasing, 
rationalized, and modern home in which Soviet workers could rest and relax 
in a cultured manner. But even as the authorities shipped citizens into their 
new homes, they gave out mixed messages. The regime was ambivalent about 
the extent to which it wanted citizens to prove active in the job of furnishing 
and decorating their new homes, fearful of raising expectations that could not 
be met and perhaps wary of entirely abandoning the revolution’s asceticism.44 
Citizens were encouraged to take pride in their new homes, but warned 
against “irrational materialism.”45 In Reid and Crowley’s formulation, “austere 
consumerism” prevailed.46 
41 Susan E. Reid, “Communist Comfort: Socialist Modernism and the Making of Cosy 
Homes in the Khrushchev Era,” Gender and History 21, 3 (2009): 465–98; Varga-Harris, 
“Home-Making.”
42 Christine Varga-Harris, “Forging Citizenship on the Home Front: Reviving the Socialist 
Contract and Constructing Soviet Identity during the Thaw,” in Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, 
101–16; Mark B. Smith, “Khrushchev’s Promise to Eliminate the Urban Housing Shortage: 
Rights, Rationality, and the Communist Future,” in Soviet State and Society, 26–45, esp. 38–41.
43 Steven E. Harris, “ ‘I Know All the Secrets of My Neighbors’: The Quest for Privacy in the 
Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Borders of Socialism, 171–90.
44 Susan E. Reid, “Destalinization and Taste, 1953–1963,” Journal of Design History 10, 
2 (1997): 177–201; Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of 
Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61, 2 (2002): 211–52; 
Varga-Harris, “Home-Making”; Kelly, Refining Russia, 315; Stephen Lovell, Summerfolk: A 
History of the Dacha, 1710–2000 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 184–85.
45 Varga-Harris, “Home-Making,” 573.
46 Reid and Crowley, “Style and Socialism,” 12. On consumption in post-Stalinist life, see 
also Ol´ga Gurova, “The Life Span of Things in Soviet Society: Notes on the Sociology of 
Underwear,”  Russian Studies in History 48, 1 (2009): 46–57; and Ekaterina Gerasimova and 
Sof´ia Chuikina, “The Repair Society,” Russian Studies in History 48, 1 (2009): 58–74. 
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Recent research thus explores how individuals and families engaged with 
public agencies and discourses but did so in a way that was often unpredictable 
and diverged from official aims, themselves at times ambiguous and contested. 
In the same year as Kharkhordin published his stimulating claims about 
the Khrushchev era, Victor Buchli, an anthropologist whose work pointed 
in a similar direction, spoke of the Khrushchev era as a “second cultural 
revolution.”47 Perhaps this term is appropriate, but only if we recognize that 
revolutions rarely follow their leaders’ blueprint. 
Dissent: Toward the Collapse?
At the end of the 1990s, Anna Krylova criticized the hangover of Cold War 
thinking that left American scholarship still searching for a “liberal subject” 
ready to rebel against the Soviet system.48 The urge to locate resistance, 
dissimulation, and counterculture has perhaps even grown since the end of 
the Cold War, certainly within Russia. 1991 casts a long shadow, tempting 
us to look for early signs of the impending collapse. Yet Nikolai Mitrokhin 
has explicitly argued against such a position: “In my opinion,” he writes, “the 
notion that the conditions for the collapse of the USSR had ripened by the 
middle of the 1980s is a political construct, formulated and propagandized 
by former political leaders of the USSR-Russia from the late 1980s–90s and 
their associates. In actual fact, no visible preconditions were noted in the 
mid-1980s.”49
Paradoxically, perhaps, a work which could be characterized as the first 
major study of protest under Khrushchev itself questions the paradigm. When 
it was translated in 2002, Vladimir Kozlov’s Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri 
Khrushcheve i Brezhneve was given the English title Mass Uprisings in the USSR: 
Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years, which, as one reviewer astutely 
noted, emphasized ideas of confrontation and conflict notably missing from 
the Russian “mass disturbances.”50 Drawing on extensive archival materials, 
Kozlov studies incidents of civil unrest that occurred in the Khrushchev era, 
exploring the conditions that provoked these violent eruptions, but rather 
than seeing these moments as popular protest against the regime, he argues 
that violence was a way for ordinary people to communicate their difficulties 
to the country’s leaders, suggesting that they were angry with “bad Party 
47 Buchli, Archaeology of Socialism, 137.
48 Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies,” Kritika 1, 1 (2000): 
19–46.
49 Nikolai Mitrokhin, “Apparat TSK KPSS v 1953–1985 godakh kak primer ‘zakrytogo’ 
obshchestva,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, no. 100 (2009) (www.nlobooks.ru/rus/magazines/
nlo/196/1641/1677, accessed 12 January 2011).
50 Vladimir Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years, 
trans. Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Donald Filtzer, 
review of Mass Uprisings, Europe–Asia Studies 56, 2 (2004): 318–20.
918 MIRIAM DOBSON
bureaucrats” and still cherished key Soviet values. In a similar vein, Steven 
Barnes argues that riots in the prison camps of Kengir during 1954 found 
protesters portraying themselves as good citizens and presenting their appeals 
as legitimate complaints against corrupt camp officials.51 Even though the 
Secret Speech produced much questioning and debate, it did not seem to 
provoke the degree of revolutionary sentiment that erupted in Hungary 
(although Politburo members were fearful that it might).52 On university 
campuses “isolated protests” occurred in the second half of 1956, particularly 
as a result of events in Eastern Europe, but, Benjamin Tromly argues, the 
generation coming through higher-education institutes in these years was 
by no means as oppositional or monolithic as retrospective narratives often 
claim. Even the most radical youths, for all their criticism of the country’s 
leaders and bureaucracy, remained “highly committed to Soviet socialism” in 
1956–57.53 An exception to this pattern is perhaps offered by Amir Weiner’s 
study of the western frontier (Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Baltic 
states), where the impact of the Hungarian and Polish uprisings, coupled 
with the return of nationalists from the Gulag, created a significant (though 
not deadly) crisis. Here, especially in the territories acquired during and after 
World War II, “the remnants of opposition forces in the Soviet Union” still 
challenged “the fundamentals of the system” and sought to replace it.54
If, at least away from the borderlands, the 1950s did not produce anti-
state or anti-Soviet rebellions as such—despite the upheavals, doubts, and 
uncertainties—then the question remains whether this changed in the following 
decade. One of the most interesting findings of Kozlov’s work is that despite 
a burst of unrest in the early 1960s (including the famous Novocherkassk 
strike), there was a marked decline in civil unrest in the mid- to late 1960s.55 
Though citing a range of factors (including more effective policing, increases 
in wages, and tolerance of the black market), Kozlov primarily argues that 
the unrest subsided “when communist ideals were practically squeezed out 
of mass consciousness by the conformism, consumerism, and individualism 
of the Brezhnev era.”56 Even on the more volatile western frontier studied by 
51 Steven A. Barnes, “ ‘In a Manner Befitting Soviet Citizens’: An Uprising in the Post-Stalin 
Gulag,” Slavic Review 64, 4 (2005): 823–50, here 849.
52 Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises,” 195–98.
53 Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia,” 292. Fürst makes a similar argument, 
noting that most young people were content to ask questions, rather than formulate their own 
programmatic positions. Fürst, “Arrival of Spring?” 140.
54 Weiner, “Empires Pay a Visit.”
55 Kozlov, Mass Uprisings. See also Robert Hornsby, “Voicing Discontent: Political Dissent 
from the Secret Speech to Khrushchev’s Ouster,” in Soviet State and Society, 162–80; and 
Samuel H. Baron, Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherskassk, 1962 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2001).
56 Kozlov, Mass Uprisings, 313–14. 
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Weiner the atmosphere calmed: the Prague Spring of 1968 sparked rumors 
and expressions of nationalist anger, but the era of large, political protests 
seemed to have ended, and reactions were less violent than 12 years earlier.57 
On the basis of current research, then, it seems that the Soviet Union of the 
1960s experienced less overt conflict between state and society than elsewhere 
in the industrialized world: Moscow was no Paris, and students did not storm 
MGU or bring the capital to a standstill.58
Political protest in the USSR may have been less dramatic than 
in certain other parts of the industrialized world, but the “sixties” have 
been similarly mythologized as a transformative moment in which young 
intellectuals—the shestidesiatniki (sixties generation)—began to think more 
critically, to establish new, more open friendships, and to rediscover artistic 
and scientific inspiration.59 The Russian sociologist Boris Firsov recently 
identified the first two postwar decades as a period in which a younger 
generation, having escaped the direct impact of Stalinist terror, developed 
new morals and values, including greater individualism, climaxing by 
the 1960s in a generation who were able to hold different opinions.60 
Sheila Fitzpatrick has suggested that although the period is yet to be 
fully researched, the indications are that by the 1960s the “whole Soviet 
idiom and persona” had become a cliché which generated “both parody 
and rejection.”61 But how widespread were such sentiments, and what was 
their political significance? Was the dissident movement, initiated by the 
most radical of the shestidesiatniki, the tip of a much larger—and from 
the regime’s perspective lethal—iceberg?
In his Everything Was Forever until It Was No More, the anthropologist 
Alexei Yurchak directly interrogated these issues and argued that it was only 
in the late 1980s that people began to claim—retrospectively—their alienation 
from “official” language.62 Unlike Kozlov, Yurchak does not interpret the lack 
of protest in the USSR’s final decades as a sign of society’s “conformism, 
consumerism, and individualism,” but neither does he follow Kharkhordin 
57 Amir Weiner, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Prague Spring, Romanian Summer, and Soviet 
Autumn on the Soviet Western Frontier,” Contemporary European History 15, 2 (2006): 
159–94.
58 Alexander Daniel, “1968 in Moscow: A Beginning,” Eurozine (www.eurozine.com/articles/
article_2008-09-02-daniel-en.html, accessed 5 January 2011).
59 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap, 2009); Petr Vail´ and Aleksandr Genis, 60-e: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Ann Arbor, 
MI: Ardis, 1988). 
60 B. M. Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR: 1940–1960-e gody: Istoriia, teoriia i praktika (St. 
Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet v Sankt-Peterburge and Evropeiskii dom, 2008), 455–57. 
61 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear off the Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 25.
62 Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 7.
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in viewing late Soviet citizens as dissimulators, who acted differently in the 
“official public” and the “hidden intimate.”63 Instead Yurchak argues that 
citizens were not necessarily either for or against “official” values: “depending 
on the context they might reject a certain meaning, norm, or value, be apathetic 
about another, continue actively subscribing to a third, creatively reinterpret a 
fourth, and so on. These dispositions were emergent, not static.”64 In Yurchak’s 
interpretation, even the widespread practice of joke telling, which relied on 
the absurdities and ironies of late Soviet life (the food shortages, the aging 
leadership, the repetitions of the press), in the end allowed these problems 
to remain “relatively unarticulated in any more explicit critical analysis.”65 
Yurchak’s work has already stimulated considerable discussion. In an article 
devoted to the issues he raises, Benjamin Nathans and Kevin Platt argue 
that the questions that concerned dissidents also mattered to many citizens 
and that the disjuncture between public discourses and private life was more 
63 Ibid., 17; Kozlov, Mass Uprisings, 313–14; Kharkhordin, The Collective, 316–17.
64 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 28–29.
65 Ibid., 290.
E. Ivanov and Veniamin Briskin, Sixth International Festival of Youth and 
Students for Peace and Friendship, 1957 
Postcard, Ne boltai! Collection, Prague
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painful than Yurchak concedes.66 In Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, one of 
the first archive-based monographs to explore this period, Sergei Zhuk argues 
that Yurchak’s work underestimates the degree of conflict, particularly the 
importance of the KGB and police interference “in the cultural consumption 
of late socialism.”67
The discussions stimulated by Yurchak’s work suggest that questions 
of identity, subjectivity, and language, a key facet of recent scholarship on 
Stalinism, will remain important as researchers begin writing the social and 
cultural history of the 1960s and 1970s. One possible approach to these 
issues might lie with microhistory. Mitrokhin has argued that distinct and 
“closed” social groups, often based on a shared workplace, emerged in late 
Soviet society with their own distinctive social, educational, mental, and 
linguistic norms.68 He shows how this worked through a close study of the 
cultural practices developed among party workers at the Central Committee 
headquarters on Moscow’s Old Square. Similar approaches to other less 
privileged communities could help us develop a deeper understanding of how 
Soviet citizens related not only to the Soviet “regime” (which easily slips into 
some of the binaries critiqued by Yurchak) but also to their work and hobbies; 
their cities, neighborhoods, and apartments; their colleagues, family, lovers, 
and friends—revealing their attitudes to a whole host of issues from fashion 
to food, romance to religion. Mitrokhin, like many other historians and 
anthropologists working on this period, uses interviews, a methodology that 
seems to bring us enticingly close to the Brezhnevian subject. Yet, though oral 
history has the potential to make scholarship of the late Soviet era distinct 
and exciting, the question of how historians deal with the imprint that post-
Soviet life inescapably leaves on interview transcripts is one that still demands 
careful consideration.
Conclusion 
How does the research discussed here impact on existing paradigms? The 
“thaw” concept has long prevailed as a metaphor for the period, but it has also 
provoked significant discussion, not least because its meaning is ambiguous: 
66 Kevin M. F. Platt and Bendzhamin Natans [Benjamin Nathans], “Sotsialisticheskaia po 
forme, neopredelennaia po soderzhaniiu: Pozdnesovetskaia kul´tura i kniga Alekseia Iurchaka 
“Vse bylo navechno, poka ne konchilos´,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, no. 101 (2010) (www.
nlobooks.ru/rus/magazines/nlo/196/1717/1724, accessed 12 January 2011). The relationship 
between emotions and political action is also explored in Glennys Young, “Emotions, 
Contentious Politics, and Empire: Some Thoughts about the Soviet Case,” Ab Imperio, no. 2 
(2007): 113–50.
67 Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet 
Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; and 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 14.
68 Mitrokhin, “Apparat TsK KPSS.” 
922 MIRIAM DOBSON
does the “thaw” refer to the warmth and light of spring, or does it instead evoke 
the filth and dirt exposed as the winter snows melt?69 Should the emphasis be 
on the new life it brings, or on its temporary nature, its vulnerability to new 
freezes?70 In the light of recent research some scholars question whether—at 
least in the commonly held sense of a time when the Stalinist “winter” began 
to melt—the metaphor adequately reflects the period, and whether all Soviet 
citizens would have characterized their lives in the 1950s and 1960s in these 
terms.71 Others continue to find it stimulating, but take a probing approach: 
Bittner, for example, insists on the metaphor’s multiple meanings and teases 
out the differences between the way the Moscow intelligentsia experienced 
the period and the way they remembered it.72 
Perhaps because of its multiple meanings, and certainly because of its 
ongoing resonance in Russia’s cultural memory, the “thaw” will surely continue 
to be invoked. It is, however, worth considering other possibilities. With regard 
to the postwar experience of Western Europe and North America, we tend to 
think in terms of decades, each one assigned its own specific characteristics. 
This is perhaps most true of the 1960s, which, in the popular imagination, 
symbolize radical change: the “swinging sixties” were the era of second-wave 
feminism, sexual emancipation, protest movements, and subversive youth 
culture.73 Disentangling myth is a difficult task for historians of the 1960s 
on either side of the east–west divide, and in both cases the question of how 
widespread the social changes were, and how long-lasting their effect, remains 
open to debate. As noted earlier, some recent scholarship has suggested that 
social changes were occurring throughout Soviet society—for example, 
marital and sexual habits appear to be in flux in these years.74 Roth-Ey’s new 
monograph argues that television, radio, magazines, and increased leisure 
time transformed urban society, and that as people became avid consumers of 
the mass media, social habits shifted in important ways.75 
69 Vail´ and Genis noted that synonyms for the thaw were “slush” (sliakot´ ) or “spring,” 
depending on the perspective taken (60-e, 32–33).
70 D. M. Magomedova, “O genezise literaturno-politicheskoi metafory ‘ottepeli,’ ” in 
Sotsiokul´turnyi fenomen shestidesiatykh, ed. V. I. Tiupa and O. V. Fedunina (Moscow: Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2008), 79–83. 
71 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 15; Smith, Property of Communists, 12. 
72 Bittner, Many Lives. 
73 The classic work is Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, 
Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For an 
exploration of how different characterizations of the 1950s and 1960s have evolved, see Marcus 
Daniel, Happy Days and Wonder Years: The Fifties and the Sixties in Contemporary Cultural 
Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004).
74 Shlapentokh, Love, Marriage; Kon, Sexual Revolution; Field, Private Life. 
75 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That 
Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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Less obvious, perhaps, might be parallels with the experience of the 1950s 
in other industrialized countries, particularly the United States. Although—
at least for American conservatives—the 1950s have been remembered as 
a haven of innocence before the decadence of the 1960s, the scholarship 
of the last 20 years has suggested that this was an “age of anxiety” in the 
face of the Cold War threat. In the historiography of the United States, the 
glorification of motherhood, the fear of sexual deviancy and crime, and the 
quest for conformity have all been read as responses to the apocalyptic fears 
generated by the bomb, as well as to the social upheaval wrought by World 
War II.76 Similar patterns might be discernible in the Soviet Union: Field, for 
example, notes that, like American anticommunists, Soviet officials linked 
homosexuality to the Cold War enemy,77 while other scholars note “moral 
panics” regarding crime and youth fashions in the 1950s.78 The impact of 
both war trauma and nuclear fear on the collective psyche are topics that 
perhaps deserve greater attention.
Thinking in terms of the characteristics of a decade is inevitably reductive 
and feeds on retrospective mythologization. As a thought exercise, however, 
it might at least remind us to consider phenomena that transcend national 
boundaries (including the aftermath of war, the threat of nuclear annihilation, 
and the transformations to culture and domestic life created by technological 
advances). It also brings to light certain differences between the 1950s and 
the 1960s and thus between the early and the late years of the “thaw.” In 
pointing to the diverse nature of the “thaw” experience, recent research has 
effectively highlighted the difficulty in identifying a single cut-off point. 
In the field of Gulag reform and criminal justice policy some of the more 
utopian projects were abandoned as early as 1960;79 but in terms of high 
76 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: 
Basic Books, 1988). See also Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, Rethinking Cold War Culture 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), particularly the essays by Joanne 
Meyerowitz and Jane Sherron De Hart. 
77 Field, Private Life, 56.
78 The stiliagi in particular seem to have caused moral panic. See Kharkhordin, The Collective, 
290–91; and Mark Edele, “Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and the Life of 
the Stiliagi, 1945–53,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50, 1 (2002): 37–61.
79 In an article on prison reform, Marc Elie describes a “conservative shift” taking place from 
1960 to 1964. See his “Khrushchev’s Gulag: Camps, Colonies, and Prisons in the USSR, 
1953–1964,” paper presented at “The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s 
and 1960s,” University of California, Berkeley, 12–15 May 2005. In her work on the KGB, 
Julie Elkner argues that the security services had largely been rehabilitated by the end of the 
1950s (“The Changing Face of Repression under Khrushchev,” in Soviet State and Society, 
142–61). On the increased readiness to brand deviant behavior as “criminal” by the early 
1960s, see Nataliia Lebina, “Antimiry: Printsipy konstruirovaniia anomalii, 1950–1960-gody,” 
in Sovetskaia sotsial´naia politika, 255–65, here 264; and Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 
189–214. 
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culture, particularly literature and film, the years following the 22nd Party 
Congress were perhaps the most innovative (and contested).80 Moreover, if 
welfare provision, rising living standards, and the growth of a more complex 
and diverse mass culture are incorporated into our understanding of the 
“thaw,” then imposing a distinct end date becomes even more challenging. 
Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, Pavel Romanov, and Nataliia Lebina recently 
identified the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s as the “prime 
years” (rastsvet) of the Soviet system, in terms of its progress in home building, 
medical provision, education, and welfare.81
A certain degree of teleology is inescapable, but we perhaps need to look 
not only to 1991 but also beyond. The end of communist power was, without 
doubt, a radical break; the pace of change encouraged, and was driven by, 
people’s ability to think about the old way of life as abnormal, impossible, 
absurd. Yet, to my mind, the rise of nostalgia and the contested nature of 
historical memory in Russia today also point to the conflicting and ambiguous 
emotions, beliefs, and experiences that the Soviet project engendered and 
sustained throughout the 74 years of its existence, including the post-Stalin 
era. For the journal reader carefully composing her letter to the editor, the 
government minister drafting measures to improve living conditions, and the 
friends socializing around the new kitchen table, what was perhaps unique 
about the Khrushchev era was the intensity, unpredictability, and relative 
freedom with which both the Soviet past and future could be contemplated 
and discussed.
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